Can someone who never existed inherit under a Will? In the Will of Clifford Stanley Perrin [2026] QSC 247 examines the consequences of online romance fraud and a testamentary gift to an imaginary spouse.
Severance of a testamentary gift based on a false assumption
A testamentary gift may be invalidated where made following the deception of the testator into believing that a beneficiary possessed a particular identity, status or characteristic which, in fact, they did not possess.
The principle originates in Kennell v Abbott (1799) 4 Ves. 802; 31 E.R. 416, involving a bigamous marriage. A woman, unaware that her purported husband was already married, left him a substantial testamentary benefit. The Court held that the gift could not stand because the testator made it on the mistaken assumption that the beneficiary was her lawful husband. The testator’s decision to benefit him rested on that mistaken assumption.
The principle was subsequently affirmed in Giles v Giles (1836) 1 Keen 685 and Posner v Miller [1953] P 277. These authorities distinguish between a mere misdescription of a beneficiary, which ordinarily does not invalidate a gift, and a gift procured by fraudulently assuming a particular character or identity. In the latter circumstances, the Court may set aside the affected disposition.
Although applied rarely in modern succession cases, the doctrine’s validity has not been seriously questioned. In the Will of Clifford Stanley Perrin [2026] QSC 247, Treston J considered whether the testamentary provisions benefiting Stella Bennett should be severed because the deceased had acted under a false assumption concerning her character or identity.
Her Honour concluded that the doctrine provided an alternative basis for invalidating those provisions. However, having already determined that Stella’s appointment and entitlement failed under the principles in Jones v Westcomb (1711) Prec Ch 316; 24 ER 149, it was unnecessary to rely on fraud as the operative ground.
Treston J accordingly pronounced the Will valid in solemn form but declared that Stella’s appointment and testamentary benefit had failed. The deceased’s daughter, Tanya Vida Maree Stankovich ( the applicant), was entitled to probate as the named executor and to the residuary estate as its sole beneficiary.
The decision’s significance lies in its recognition that a Will may remain valid even if particular provisions fail because of a fraudulent assumption about a beneficiary.
The doctrine permits severance of the affected gifts without necessarily invalidating the testamentary instrument as a whole.
Importantly, the principle is narrower than a general mistake about a beneficiary. It concerns a false assumption of character or identity that was material to the testamentary gift, rather than mere disappointment, misdescription or a subsequently discovered misunderstanding.
The decision illustrates the continuing relevance of Kennell v Abbott (1799) 4 Ves. 802; 31 E.R. 416 as an alternative ground for challenging testamentary dispositions where fraud has influenced the testator’s choice of beneficiary.
When Clifford Stanley Perrin (the deceased) died in Maryborough Hospital on Christmas Eve 2025, aged 84, he left behind a modest estate, an estranged daughter (the applicant) and a Will naming a woman he believed he had married more than a decade earlier.
One extraordinary problem emerged: the woman he called his wife did not exist.
Over approximately 13 years, the deceased was drawn into an elaborate online romance scam involving a supposed former New York fashion model, a marriage by proxy, a substantial overseas inheritance and repeated requests for money.
By the time the deceased died, their finances had been severely depleted. The estate’s only remaining asset was a small property at Point Vernon, Hervey Bay, which was itself subject to a reverse mortgage.
In the Supreme Court of Queensland, Treston J had to decide whether the purported wife could inherit his estate and, if not, whether the applicant could inherit under a provision in the Will that contemplated the purported wife’s death.
A Marriage Made on the Internet
The deceased was a retired pensioner living alone in Hervey Bay when he began communicating online with a woman who called herself Stella Helena Bennett around 2012.
Stella claimed to be a former New York fashion model, born in 1976, who came from a prosperous family. Although supposedly 35 years younger than the deceased, Stella claimed a romantic interest in him.
They never met.
Nevertheless, the deceased believed they had married on 25 April 2013 in Massena, New York, through a proxy arrangement. The deceased later told a friend about the marriage, enclosing a photograph of an attractive young woman who he claimed would soon move to Australia.
Stella provided what appeared to be a marriage certificate, later found to be fraudulent.
The certificate contained numerous irregularities, including a reference to Fresno County as being in New York rather than California, an incorrect description of New York’s governmental status and a misspelling of the bride’s name.
Enquiries with the relevant authorities in New York confirmed they had not registered such a marriage.
The Inheritance That Never Arrived
Stella claimed to have inherited substantial funds from her father, but the release of the money stalled until payment of various taxes and charges.
The deceased was persuaded to assist financially, initially with supposed American tax obligations and subsequently with alleged Malaysian inheritance taxes after Stella claimed to have relocated to Kuala Lumpur. Over the years, her demands included bank transfers, Bitcoin, gift cards, mobile phones, SIM cards and personal identification information.
Stella also accessed the deceased’s sensitive financial and government account details. Documents supposedly supporting her inheritance were subsequently exposed as forgeries. Although the fraud used the identity of a legitimate Malaysian company, the company was not implicated.
At one point, the deceased’s bank blocked a transfer because the recipient account was associated with a scam. Rather than establish her identity, Stella encouraged the deceased to misrepresent the transaction’s purpose to the bank.
Stella also repeatedly pressed the deceased to take out a reverse mortgage on his home.
Treston J found compelling evidence that the deceased had been the victim of a prolonged romance scam.
A Will Leaving Everything to a fictional spouse
On 3 May 2024, the deceased executed a handwritten Will, witnessed by two Justices of the Peace. He appointed Stella, whom he described as his wife, as executor and trustee, to whom he left the bulk of his estate.
However, the Will contained two important alternative provisions.
If Stella could not act as executor because of illness, injury, or death, the deceased appointed the applicant to act in her place.
The Will also provided that if Stella died before the deceased, the applicant would inherit his entire estate.
The deceased’s relationship with the applicant was distant and at times strained. The deceased had initially denied paternity, although DNA testing subsequently established a 99.99 per cent probability that the deceased was the applicant’s father.
Despite their limited contact, the deceased deliberately named her as substitute executor and beneficiary.
That decision ultimately proved decisive.
Could a Person Who Never Existed Inherit?
Treston J accepted the proper execution of the deceased’s Will and that there was no evidence the deceased lacked testamentary capacity. The difficulty concerned identifying its principal beneficiary.
After examining the forged documents, extensive electronic communications, absence of any personal meeting and Stella’s refusal to establish her identity even following the deceased’s death, the Court concluded that Stella did not exist as the person Mr Perrin believed her to be.
Her appointment as executor and the testamentary gift in her favour therefore failed.
Treston J drew upon Re the Will of William Ian Southey [2025] VSC 801, another case involving an online relationship and the inability to establish a testamentary beneficiary’s supposed identity.
But this left a further problem.
The applicant was to inherit only if Stella died before the deceased. How could that condition be satisfied when Stella had never existed?
The Rule in Jones v Westcomb
The answer lay in a principle of testamentary construction dating back more than 300 years.
Under the rule in Jones v Westcomb (1711) Prec Ch 316; 24 ER 149, a gift intended to operate upon a specified contingency may sometimes take effect when a different, unforeseen event occurs.
The rule in Jones v Westcomb (1711) Prec Ch 316; 24 ER 149 is not a general power to rewrite a Will or achieve what seems fair. Rather, the Court must be satisfied that, had the testator contemplated the event that actually occurred, it necessarily follows from the Will and admissible surrounding circumstances that the intended alternative gift would operate.
Treston J examined this principle in Re Edwards [2014] VSC 392 and, more recently, in Savage v Savage [2023] QSC 280.
In the Will of Clifford Stanley Perrin [2026] QSC 247, the Court identified several compelling circumstances.
First, despite their estrangement, the deceased had expressly chosen that the applicant receive the entire estate if Stella predeceased him.
Second, he appointed the applicant as substitute executor if Stella were unable or unwilling to serve.
Third, the wording of the Will showed the deceased had considered the disposition of the entire estate, not merely particular assets. Finally, and perhaps most remarkably the deceased had expressed suspicions about Stella.
As early as 2015, the deceased had raised concerns that Stella might be involved in fraud and operating under different identities. In August 2024, the deceased recorded further suspicions about identity theft, fraudulent activity and Stella’s uncertain whereabouts.
Those suspicions, considered alongside the provisions of the Will, supported the conclusion that the deceased would have wanted the applicant to inherit if he had known Stella was fictitious.
Her Honour therefore applied Jones v Westcomb, finding that the gift to the applicant operated notwithstanding that the precise condition specified in the Will — Stella’s death — had never occurred.
An Alternative Ground: Fraud and False Assumption
Treston J also considered an alternative basis for invalidating the gift to Stella. Under the principle established in Kennell v Abbott (1799) 4 Ves. 802; 31 E.R. 416, setting aside a testamentary disposition may occur where the beneficiary has fraudulently assumed a particular identity or status that materially influenced the testator’s decision to make the gift.
In Kennell v Abbott, a woman left property to a man she believed was her lawful husband, unaware that he was already married.
The principle in Kennell v Abbott distinguishes an innocent misdescription of a beneficiary from a fraudulent representation concerning the beneficiary’s identity or character.
Although modern succession litigation rarely invokes it, the doctrine remains relevant.
Her Honour indicated that, had it not resolved the matter through Jones v Westcomb, it would have severed the provisions benefiting Stella on the alternative ground of fraudulent assumption of identity or character.
The Court’s Decision
Treston J upheld the deceased’s Will as a valid testamentary instrument but determined that Stella’s appointment as executor and the gifts in her favour failed.
The applicant was entitled to a grant of probate as the executor named in the alternative provision and to receive the residuary estate as its sole beneficiary.
Her Honour ordered the estate to pay the costs of the proceedings on an indemnity basis.
Why This Case Matters
In the Will of Clifford Stanley Perrin [2026] QSC 247 illustrates how established succession principles can accommodate an increasingly modern problem: online romance fraud directed at elderly and socially isolated people. It also demonstrates several important distinctions in probate law.
A valid Will does not necessarily mean every gift within it is effective.
A testamentary instrument may satisfy the formal requirements for execution while a particular disposition fails because its intended beneficiary does not exist.
An unforeseen event may activate a substitute gift. The rule in Jones v Westcomb can apply where the Court is satisfied, as a matter of necessary implication, that the testator intended the alternative beneficiary to inherit in the circumstances that actually arose.
Fraudulent assumptions about identity may invalidate testamentary gifts. The longstanding principle in Kennell v Abbott remains a potential means of challenging gifts induced by a beneficiary’s false identity or status.
For solicitors preparing wills, the case also highlights the importance of establishing beneficiaries’ identities, particularly where the testator has formed an exclusively online relationship involving requests for financial assistance.
In the Will of Clifford Stanley Perrin [2026] QSC 247 is especially significant because Treston J did not simply substitute their own view of what a fair distribution would have been. Her Honour’s conclusion rested upon the deceased’s actual testamentary language and the surrounding evidence of his intentions.
A Final Observation
The deceased spent more than a decade believing he was married to a woman he had never met. The supposed wife extracted financial assistance from the deceased while promising a future together that never materialised.
Yet the deceased’s Will contained a provision that ultimately preserved his estate for the applicant.
The legal significance of In the Will of Clifford Stanley Perrin [2026] QSC 247 is not simply that a fictitious spouse could not inherit. It is that Treston J was able to give effect to the testator’s demonstrated intentions without invalidating the Will itself.
A rule developed in the early eighteenth century provided the solution to a twenty-first-century romance scam.