Family provision & common mistake

In NSW, once an adoption order is made the adopted child ceases to be regarded as the child of the birth parent: s95(2) of the Adoption Act 2000.


Glenn Daley (the plaintiff) was given $5,000 in the will of his father John Richardson which stated

…I no longer have contact with my children GLENN and ROSEALIE, and due to the breakdown in our relationship, it is my wish that they don’t receive any further distribution from my estate.

Further, the Testator’s will gave

the rest and residue of my estate to my daughter DAWN


The plaintiff brought a family provision application. At mediation on 12 April 2021, the parties reached a settlement where they agreed to further provision.

However, following the mediation, it was discovered that the plaintiff had been adopted out by John Richardson.

As a corollary the plaintiff was not an eligible person to bring a family provision claim against the estate of the deceased: s57(1)(c) of the Succession Act 2006.


In Daley v Donaldson [2021] NSWSC 1507 the plaintiff sought the Court’s determination under s 73 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).

On the day of the mediation, there was no evidence that the plaintiff had been given up for adoption by the deceased as such he was eligible to bring a family provision claim as the deceased’s biological child.

The Defendant submitted that both parties were operating under the mistaken assumption that the Plaintiff was an eligible person, when, he was not, and that the settlement agreement had been made upon the basis of representations, including by the deceased in his Will, which were incorrect.

The Defendant also submitted that

“[I]n light of the fact that the parties operated under a common misapprehension as to basis of their negotiations, the court … should decline to give effect to the settlement dated 12 April 2021”.

Although the circumstances surrounding the adoption, its precise date, and the documents evidencing the adoption order were not in evidence the plaintiff stated that he had been adopted by Keith John Daley who was married to his mother, the former wife of the deceased.

In his affidavit of 29 June 2021, the Plaintiff stated:

At the time of swearing my first Affidavit, I was not aware that I was formally adopted by Keith John Daley.

It has since come to my attention that I was…adopted by Keith John Daley.”

The defendant submitted that the plaintiff should be recognised as the lawful child of Keith Daley in the proceedings.

The decision

The Court agreed that as the parties were mistaken about the status of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the common misapprehension concerning the status of the plaintiff as an eligible person attracts the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction in the interests of justice.

The Court refused to make orders that reflect any compromise that was reached between the parties.

Posthumous donation of human tissue

In New South Wales where the deceased has provided consent the Human Tissue Act 1983 permits removal of human tissue after death for transplantation or other therapeutic or medical use in another person.

The Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) provides that use of gametes or embryos is permitted after death if

  • the donor has consented to such use;
  • the woman who is to use the gametes has been notified of the gamete provider’s death; and
  • the woman consents to use the gametes.

However, the Act does not cover situations where the deceased did not consent to the use of their gametes prior to death.

The Transplantation and Anatomy Act 1978 (ACT) permits the posthumous removal of tissue where the deceased:

  • expressed the wish for, or consented to, the removal, and
  • the senior available next of kin does not object to the removal for transplantation into the body of a living person.

Importantly there are no specific laws governing the posthumous use of gametes.


Mr Baratikeshe died in a motorcycle accident in June 2019. Before his death, he and his wife Ms Hosseini had been attempting to conceive a child but had not commenced IVF treatment. Ms Hosseini was named executor and beneficiary of her husband’s estate.

Ms Hosseini posthumously obtained permission for sperm retrieval from the deputy Coroner. She arranged for its retrieval and storage by Genea Ltd.


In Hosseini v Genea Ltd [2021] NSWSC 1568 the plaintiff applied for a declaration that

  • she was entitled to the sperm and
  • the defendant was entitled to release it to her for transportation to the ACT for use.

The court held that the sample was lawfully removed from the deceased’s body and, as his executor, beneficiary and senior available next of kin under the Human Tissue Act 1983 (NSW), the plaintiff was entitled to possession of it.

Additionally, as the defendant did not

  • claim any rights to the sample
  • dispute the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession and
  • object to the orders sought being made

its storage of the sample is finished and it may be released to the plaintiff.

Presumption of death ACT

Section 9A of the Administration and Probate Act 1929 (ACT) provides that probate of the will or administration of the estate, of a person may be granted by the Supreme Court if it is satisfied, by direct evidence or by evidence supporting a presumption of death, that the person is, or may be presumed to be, dead.

This is usually done using a death certificate which is annexed to the supporting affidavit for a grant of probate or letters of administration of the deceased estate.

At common law

The common law presumption of death after the lapse of seven years was described by Dixon J in Axon v Axon:

“…at least seven years have elapsed since he was last seen or heard of by those…likely to have received communication from him…in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be found that he is dead.”

(1937) 59 CLR 395 at 405

Reliance upon the presumption is not necessary when the facts establish, even by inference, that the person is deceased.

In the ACT death can be proved by an application to the ACT Supreme Court under r 3012 of the Court Procedures Rules.


EI married in January 2020. He lived with his wife, two of his daughters and his stepdaughter at a house in a suburb of Canberra.

EI suffered from anxiety and post‑traumatic stress disorder. His first partner had died under tragic circumstances. At about midnight on 15 July 2021, EI left the family home in an emotional and intoxicated state. Shortly after he left, he sent a text message which included a statement that he loved the plaintiff and a statement that he hated the world and could not live in it anymore.

Police ceased searching on 17 July 2021 they considered that he may be dead due to the bad weather conditions. They ceased searching on that date.

The decision

In Re Estate of EI [2022] ACTSC 55 the plaintiff sought a declaration that EI died on 15 July 2021. The plaintiff submitted that EI has not:

  • returned to the family
  • used the joint bank account he held with the plaintiff.
  • used their shared email address to send any emails.
  • contacted the plaintiff or any other members of his family.

The court was satisfied that on the balance of probabilities EI died on 15 July 2021. Ordering the costs of the application be paid out of the estate.

Removal of an Executor by the Victorian Supreme Court.

An executor’s role is to get in the assets of the deceased, to pay the estate debts, the legacies given by the will, and distribute the estate assets. It is common for a will-maker to appoint the same person as executor and trustee. Once they have completed the executorial duties, they hold the property as trustee.

If the trustee has to deal with later discovered estate assets, they take them as executor. Therefore the same person may be both executor and trustee of different assets at the same time.

Where the executor who has been granted probate remains out of Victoria for more than two years or is unfit to act or incapable of acting, the Victorian Supreme Court can remove an executor under s 34 of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic). Additionally, the court may appoint a trustee under s48 of the Trustee Act 1958 (Vic).

The decision to remove an executor or trustee is at the courts discretion. It depends on the facts of each case and what is best for the welfare of the trust or estate as a whole after considering;

  • the interests of the beneficiaries,
  • the security of estate property, and
  • the efficient and satisfactory execution of the trusts and a faithful and sound exercise of the powers held by an executor or trustee.

Back ground

Avgi Demetrios Vasiliades died on 14 September 2019 leaving a will dated 27 November 2016 (the will). Avgi was survived by her four children: Xenia, the plaintiff, Socrates, the defendant, Maria and Vasil. Socrates and Maria live outside of Australia.

The will appointed Socrates as executor, with Maria appointed as the substitute executor. The residue of the estate is bequeathed to the four children in equal shares.

Xenia and Vasil were appointed by Avgi as her financial and medical attorneys prior to her death. There were a number of disputes between Xenia and Vasil as to the management of Avgi’s affairs one of which was the subject of a VCAT proceeding.

The proceedings

Xenia believed that Socrates should renounce probate; he refused. Xenia lodged a probate caveat and sought orders that Socrates be replaced by an independent administrator.

Xenia’s application for Socrates’ removal was supported by Maria who as she lived overseas did not want to be appointed as executor. Socrates and Vasil opposed the application.

After the probate caveat lapsed Socrates was granted probate on 29 June 2020.

Xenia submitted on several grounds that Socrates should be removed as executor under s34 of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) including that he had remained outside of Australia since August 2008.

The decision

The court held that Xenia failed to provide sufficient evidence that Socrates’ conduct was sufficient to have him removed as an executor.

The VCAT proceeding was not considered sufficient grounds for removal as Socrates was not a party to and the estate did not have an interest in the proceeding.

Similarly, Socrates overseas residency was not sufficient as he had not been overseas for two years from the date of the grant.

Adoption, Intestacy and the Biological parent.

In Australia, following adoption, the adopted child becomes a full member of the adopting parents’ family and generally, all prior legal familial relationships cease to exist.

In most jurisdictions, this applies equally to intestacy so that where a person has been adopted, previous family relationships have no recognition on intestacy.


Werner Ihenfeld was born in Tasmania and adopted by Werner and Anna Ihenfeld when he was 3 days old in June 1963. The Ihenfeld’s became Werner’s adoptive parents under the Adoption of Children Act 1920 in September of that year.

Following the deaths of his adoptive parents in the mid-1980s Werner sought out his biological mother Dianne Zimmerman; for the next thirty years, they enjoyed a mutually loving and caring relationship that often exists between a child and parent.

Werner died intestate without leaving a spouse or issue with the result that under s29 of the Intestacy Act (“the Act”)

The parents of an intestate are entitled to the whole of the intestate estate if the intestate leaves – (a) no spouse; and (b) no issue.

(2) If there is only one surviving parent, the entitlement vests in the parent and, if both survive, it vests in equal shares.

If there was no surviving parent the estate would pass to other relatives.

As a result of the intestacy and uncertainty as to the identity of the next of kin Letters of Administration were granted to the Public Trustee on 1 March 2019.

The matter

Dianne applied to the Supreme Court of Tasmania for the determination of whether as a result of both their loving relationship and biological relationship, gives her a right of distribution of a parent under the Act.

Under s10 of the Act an adopted child is considered to be the child of the adoptive parent or parents; biological relationships that are inconsistent with the relationship created by adoption, are to be ignored.

The Act does not provide for reversion to the biological relationships following the death of adoptive parents or to evaluate the existence, strength or type of family relationships.

The decision

In dismissing the application the Court found that Dianne was not Werner’s parent within the meaning of the Act and therefore was not entitled to a distribution from the intestate estate.





Share farming & Proprietary estoppel

The fundamental purpose of equitable estoppel is to protect a person from acting to their detriment by preventing the promisor from resiling from their promise or representation; proprietary estoppel applies where a person induces another to adopt an assumption or expectation that the other has or will obtain an interest in the first person’s property, and on the basis of this assumption the other person alters their position or acts to their detriment.

Proprietary estoppel

The two types of proprietary estoppel are:

estoppel by encouragement -where a person relies upon express promises or representations that they will obtain an interest in land, and

estoppel by acquiescence – where a person improves land in the mistaken assumption that they have an interest in the land, and the owner of the land who is aware of the mistake does nothing to dispel this assumption.


David Stone and Harry Kramer entered into an oral share farming agreement in 1975 that David would grow crops and maintain a farming property in Colo; Harry would pay all operating costs except the costs of fuel which would be shared. David would live rent free in one of the houses on the Colo Property, be paid a retainer of $600 per quarter and receive half the gross proceeds from the sale of produce and cattle.

In the early 1980s Harry told David that if he continued with the Share Farming Agreement and with management of the farm he would be left a life interest in the Colo Property in Harry’s will (the First Succession Plan).

In 1987 or 1988 Harry told David that he and Leonie had agreed that He would leave the Colo Property to her in his will, but that she would then leave the Colo Property to David (the Second Succession Plan) if he continued with the Share Farming Agreement and with management of the farm.

Harry died in 1988 Leonie as executor and beneficiary of his estate was obliged to adhere to the Share Farming Agreement, and the First and Second Succession Plans.

Following Harry’s death, Leonie told David that if he continued with the Share Farming Agreement and with management of the farm he would inherit the Colo Property together with $200000.00 (the Third Succession Plan). Leonie died in April 2016.However in her will, made on 11 November 2011 Leonie left the farm to her daughter Hilary and $200,000 to David.

The proceedings

David commenced proceedings against the executors of Leonie’s estate submitting that he had continued with the share farming agreement, and undertook additional tasks on the Colo Property, in the expectation that Leonie would bequeath the Colo property to him, instead of following a different occupation that would have provided a higher income and greater provision for his old age.

The decision

The Court was satisfied that David acted on the faith of that assurance to his detriment by continuing the farming operation on the Colo Property for about 23 years thereafter in the belief that he would inherit that property under Leonie’s will.

The court inferred from an analysis of David’s income that in the period of 1976 to 2003 he had earned roughly one third of the average annual male income.

Consequently, David was entitled to appropriate equitable relief to relieve him of the effect of Leonie’s unconscionable conduct not to have left the Farm to David in her will.

The Musician, the Manager – Administrator Pendente Lite

A Court appoints an administrator pendente lite to impartially manage and preserve a deceased estate for the benefit of those persons who may ultimately be found to be entitled to it.

Section 32 of the Administration and Probate Act (NT) provides that pending any action concerning the validity of a will, obtaining a grant of probate or administration, the Court may appoint a person as administrator of the estate with such powers as the Court thinks fit.

The Will

G died on 25 July 2017, he had prepared a document that he referred to as a will in 2015. The document did not name an executor, G was blind, could not read, or write his signature. On the document below G’s printed name is what appears to be a diagonal line. The Wills Act 2000 (NT), provides that a signature can be a mark if it is placed on the document by the will maker with a view to authenticating it as their will.

Three witnesses signed the document, the first signed below the words “Witness”, the next beneath the words “Mark T Grose”; a third next to a handwritten notation, stating to have witnessed the above being read out and understood. A video recording was made showing that the witnesses were present when G signed the will.

The Court accepted that G had signed the will and it was witnessed by three people.

The application

As the document did not appoint an executor, Mark Grose (the applicant) commenced an application for administration of the will under s 33 of the Administration and Probate Act 1969 (NT).

The will did not contain a residuary provision or make any provision for disposing of assets other than “my income”. Personal property including IP in the recordings made by G does not seem to have been dealt with in the will.

Similarly the balance of G’s bank account/s at the date of death was not dealt with by the will. Therefore a partial intestacy may result depending on what assets the deceased owned and precisely what was meant by “my income”.

Partial intestacy

A partial intestacy occurs where a will distributes only part of a deceased’s estate with the part of the estate not disposed of by the will divided according to the rules of intestacy.

In order to form a view as to the extent of the partial intestacy, the court must ascertain the assets held by the deceased at the date of death – including the type and value of personal property and the balance of any bank accounts. Similarly G’s spouse and de facto spouse had to be served with notice of the application for administration.

The applicant’s affidavit of assets and liabilities set out “all the assets and liabilities of the deceased of which at the date of swearing this affidavit I am aware” and not the assets and liabilities of the estate as at the date of death.

As G was married (though separated) at the time of his death, and also had a de-facto spouse, a partial intestacy would mean that other persons could be entitled to some of the proceeds of the estate under s66 of the Administration and Probate Act both G’s spouse and de facto spouse had to be served with all appropriate notice of the application.

Rule against perpetuities

The rule against perpetuities provides that a trust (which includes a trust created by a will) is invalid unless the property the subject of the trust is certain to vest within the perpetuity period (lifetime plus 21 years or 80 years) depending on what is specified in the instrument creating the trust.

Income from the deceased’s intellectual property was left to G’s daughter and foundation without making provision for the intellectual property to vest in anyone or specifying a perpetuity period. Both of which appeared to infringe the rule against perpetuities that would void the bequest to the foundation and his daughter, depending on the construction of the bequest and the meaning of “my income” in the will.

Intermeddling in the estate

The applicant’s evidence showed that he had been intermeddling in the estate and making distributions without the authority of letters of administration; placing him in a situation of conflict of interest if he were to be appointed as an administrator with a duty to enforce that obligation to account. If G’s daughter, wife nor the de facto spouse don’t want to apply it may be preferable for the Public Trustee to administer the estate.

On 27 October 2021, the Registrar contacted the applicant’s solicitors, seeking further information from the applicant; after several follow up emails the Registrar is yet to receive the requested information. In the meantime, the Court was concerned is that the applicant is continuing to intermeddle in the estate without the authority of letters of administration.

The interim decision

The Court did not consider it appropriate to grant letters of administration before the applicant answered the Registrar; appointing the Public Trustee as administrator pendente lite of the estate under s 32 of the Administration and Probate Act (NT). Additionally, the applicant must serve a copy of the application and supporting documents together with the court’s reasons on the deceased’s spouse and de facto spouse by 16 February 2022.

JobSeeker, COVID-19 & the AAT

The Administrative Appeals Tribunals (AAT) review decisions made by government departments by assessing the relevant facts, law and policy to make the legally correct decision or, where there can be more than one correct decision, the preferable decision.

Following the review of a decision by Centrelink’s Authorised Review officer (ARO) or Subject Matter Expert (SME) about social security pensions, benefits and allowances relating to

  • rejection of a claim;
  • suspension or cancellation of a payment;
  • rate of payment;
  • incurring and recovering a debt

the Social Services & Child Support Division of the AAT can conduct a “first review”, where they may affirm, vary ,or set aside the decision and either substitute its own decision; or return it to Centrelink to make a new decision.


A inherited a 50% share of real property from her mother’s estate. Completion of the sale of real property occurred on 26 September 2018; following which A deposited approximately $738000.00 into a bank account (the Deposit).

The Deposit was a financial asset under the asset test for the JobSeeker benefit exceeding the asset limit of $473,750. However, under the federal government’s COVID-19 measures introduced from March to September 2020, the Deposit was deemed an exempt asset under s 1118(1B) of the Act. (the exemption)

Section 1118(2B) provides that for subsection (1B), the exemption may be extended for up to a total period of 24 months from the date of completion of the sale if:

  • i. a person who has sold his or her principal home is making reasonable attempts to purchase, build, repair or renovate another residence; and
  • ii. the person has been making those attempts within a reasonable period after selling the principal home; and
  • iii. the person has experienced delays beyond his or her control in purchasing, building, repairing or renovating the other residence.

A was granted JobSeeker allowance from 26 June 2020, (the date she applied) until the expiration of the exemption on 25 September 2020.

The hearing

In DFRP and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2021] AATA 5080 A sought to review the decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division of the AAT made on 9 July 2021, which affirmed the decision of Services Australia to cancel A’s JobSeeker payments as her assets exceeded the allowable limit for JobSeeker payments under the Social Services Act 1991 (Cth).

Section 29(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act) provides that the prescribed time for lodging an application with the AAT is within 28 days after notice of a decision is given to an Applicant.

A lodged application’s for a Second Review of Decision and an Extension of Time for Making an Application for Review of Decision with the AAT on 9 September 2021.

The application for review of the Decision was required to be lodged with the AAT by 23 August 2021 therefore the application was 17 days out of time.

However, s 29(7) provides that the AAT may grant an extension of time if it is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.

Where the respondent is opposed to the extension of time, s 29(10) of the AAT Act requires the AAT to give the parties a reasonable opportunity of presenting their respective cases.

The decision

The AAT held that prescribed time limits should be complied with, however, in this case, given A’s circumstances, the length of the delay, wouldn’t cause prejudice to the Respondent or infringe on the interests of the public.

A provided no evidence that she met s1118(2B). Importantly as the maximum period permitted for the extension is 24 months from the completion of the sale of real property an extension to the exemption under s 1118(2B) would have expired on the day following the cancellation of A’s JobSeeker benefits.

The Folly of the homemade will

It has been said that a residuary clause is the most important clause in a will as it sets out who will inherit the remainder of the deceased’s assets once any debts, funeral expenses, inheritance tax and legacies have been paid, and any of the items specifically bequeathed have been distributed to the appropriate beneficiaries.

A simple will may only have a single clause setting out the residuary beneficiary or beneficiaries.

Importantly where an executor is unwilling or unable to act, then the residuary beneficiaries can apply for a ‘grant of letters of administration with the will annexed’.

An effective residuary clause avoids assets passing under the rules of intestacy, potentially to any family members who are not of the deceased’s choosing; alternatively, if there are no family members, then the assets would pass to the Crown, which many people might also wish to avoid.


Angela Thompson (the deceased) prepared a homemade will dated 3 October 2015 naming her husband Trevor as executor. The deceased estate was valued at approximately $511,000. The main assets of the estate were the Boyup Brook property with an estimated value of $130,000 and the Kelmscott property with an estimated value of $370,000.

Angela had two children, Sarah and Laura. The will provided that the Kelmscott Property

‘not be sold until majority of the residing tenants agree to the action. I wish my children to remain in abode as long as it is deemed reasonable’

However, a later clause ( cl 4) empowered the executor

‘to sell, exchange or otherwise dispose of assets in my estate on such terms as he considers expedient as though he were the absolute beneficial owner’

Additionally, cl 3 made several specific dispositions that appear to be entirely overlooked by cl 4. Although the will had no residuary clause reference was made to the residuary estate in cl 5

Trevor obtained probate of the will on 20 November 2017. The deceased estate was valued at approximately $511,000.

Trevor requested that Sarah and Laura vacate the Kelmscott property; they refused only vacating following the threat of eviction proceedings. After agreeing to vacate the property they consented to its sale.

The proceedings

Trevor made an application under s 45 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA) which provides for executors, and administrators to apply to the Supreme Court to make binding orders on

“..any question arising in respect of any will or administration..”.

Counsel for Sarah and Laura disputed the necessity for Trevor to seek directions from the court. In dismissing this argument the Court held that as the will lacked clarity, Trevor as executor of the estate was acting appropriately in seeking directions.

The decision

The Court held that the questions raised by Trevor are unanswerable with the gift of property in cl 3(b) being void for uncertainty. Additionally, the Court found cl 4 to be so broad that it is simply not possible to give a construction of the will which makes sense; as a consequence of this partial intestacy, Trevors inheritance as the deceased’s spouse was enlarged.

The court was concerned that a good part of a modest estate would be consumed expressing the case

illustrates the folly of persons making homemade wills

and that in the circumstances money spent on having a will professionally drafted is a sound investment.



“Ruinous” Family Provision Claims

In a recent case, the Supreme Court of New South Wales court of appeal observed the ruinous nature of family provision claims by adult siblings. This included the financial burden of the litigation, embittered family relationships, adverse health consequences and the breakdown of relationships due to the pressure of the proceedings. Highlighting the importance of legal practitioners emphasising that their clients fully appreciate the benefits of early mediation at the outset of family provision litigation.

The background

Elaine Jill Bassett (Jill) died on 21 March 2007, William Bassett (Bill) who died on 22 January 2014, aged 85, married in 1953 and had four children – Merilyn, Sue, Geoff and Bruce. Bill and Jill, were farmers who conducted their farming business through a series of rural partnerships.

Geoff was the only child to take up a career as a farmer working alongside his parents over the years. 

In 1998, Bill and Jill gifted Geoff a rural property known as “Pindaroi”- referred to by family members as his “early inheritance”. Pindaroi was sold by Geoff in 2009 for approximately $4.2 million.

At the time of his death, Bill and Geoff had a 50% share in a rural property, known as “The Springs”. In his will Bill left Geoff his share in any farming plant and equipment machinery, implements and livestock however Bill expressly excluded any real estate which he may have owned with Geoff. Merilyn, Sue and Bruce were residuary beneficiaries under both their parents Wills.

The Proceedings

 In 2015, Geoff made a claim under proprietary estoppel to Bill’s 50% interest in The Springs; alternatively, Geoff made a family provision claim from Bill’s Estate. 

 Merilyn and Bruce, as representatives of Jill’s Estate brought a cross-claim to recover money said to have been the subject of maladministration of Jill’s estate against Bill’s Estate and Geoff as executors of Jill’s Estate. Jill’s Estate had been fully administered well before the commencement of these proceedings and was seen to be

“an attempt to trawl through accounting documents (many years after Jill’s death) in order to see what could be recovered for their ultimate benefit.”

Additionally, Merilyn and Bruce sought indemnity from Bill’s Estate.

Geoff was unsuccessful in the proprietary estoppel claim. However, at first instance, the Court awarded Geoff a family provision of $600,000.  Additionally, as  Merilyn and Bruce had rejected Geoff’s Offer of Compromise on 31 May 2019 they were ordered to pay the costs of Geoff’s estoppel and family provision claims from 1 July 2019 on an indemnity basis. Importantly the Costs decision the court remarked it was outrageous, extraordinary be deplored that the deceased’s estate was worth between $3.5 m and $4,274,518 yet total costs of the parties were in the order of $2.5 to $3 million.

The appeal

Merilyn and Bruce appealed against the award of family provision to Geoff, the rejection of their cross-claim and the costs orders. Sue also sought to appeal from the primary judge’s decision on costs.

In dismissing Geoff’s family provision claim the Court of Appeal held that there was no basis in concluding that adequate provision had not been made for Geoff’s proper maintenance and advancement in life when the court had failed to take into account the “early inheritance”.

The court ordered that Geoff pay the Estate’s costs of the family provision and his estoppel claim until 28 June 2019, and that  Merilyn and Bruce pay Geoff’s costs of the First Cross-Claim on the ordinary basis and not out of the Estate.

In discussing it’s discretion factors the court may consider when deciding the impact of legal costs in assessing the needs and financial circumstances of applicants for family provision orders under the Succession Act.

The court observed that it is doubtful that a “wise and just testator” in whose shoes the Court notionally stands in considering questions of adequate provision for proper maintenance of an eligible applicant, would look favourably upon an adult child whose financial position has been diminished as a result of unsuccessful legal proceedings commenced against their siblings concerning the estate