Robinson v Glennon [2025] NSWSC 770 involved a claim by Ms Kylie Robinson (the plaintiff) for family provision under s 59 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW) from the intestate estate of Mr Geoffrey Baxter (the deceased), who died on 1 August 2023, at the age of 56. Ms Vicki Glennon (the defendant), the deceased’s sister, was granted letters of administration on 16 May 2025. Under the intestacy provisions (s 129), the defendant would otherwise inherit the entire estate, as the deceased had no spouse, children, or surviving parents.
The parties acknowledged that the deceased and the plaintiff had been in a relationship, although they contested its duration and character. The relationship was volatile and marked by domestic violence and alcohol abuse. They were living apart when he died, and the plaintiff only learned of his death six weeks later. The plaintiff left the deceased’s home in May 2023 following a drunken and abusive episode, but continued to regard the deceased as her de facto partner. The defendant argued that the relationship had come to a permanent end.
The deceased’s estate consisted mainly of a property in Tyndale, valued at approximately $330,000. It also included a car worth $30,000 and $873 in a bank account. There were liabilities totalling $45,506. The net value of the estate was roughly $315,000. Notably the plaintiff did not claim the spouse’s statutory legacy under s106 of the Succession Act 2006.
Brereton J ultimately held that a family provision order should be made in the plaintiff’s favour. Although the relationship was turbulent, the plaintiff was the closest person to the deceased in the last decade of his life. Notably, there had been a mutual dependence, with the plaintiff relying mainly on the deceased for accommodation. The deceased relied on the plaintiff for domestic support.
The plaintiff’s financial situation was precarious, with significant needs. Brereton J first accounted for the estate’s liabilities and capped legal costs awarding the plaintiff the entire estate, valued at under $200,000, after deducting expenses.
Broader Significance: Dependency in Estate Law
The decision in Robinson v Glennon [2025] NSWSC 770 illustrates the flexible and fact-specific nature of dependency in estate and superannuation contexts. Dependency is a foundational concept in three key areas of estate planning:
- entitlement to superannuation death benefits;
- classification as tax dependents; and
- eligibility to claim family provision under state legislation.
Each defines dependency differently, but the principles often intersect. Under s 302-200 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), for example, an interdependency relationship requires:
- a close personal relationship;
- cohabitation; and
- mutual financial and domestic support.
Failure to satisfy even one criterion—such as living together—can invalidate a binding death benefit nomination, as seen in Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT) (D16-17\149), where the fiancée of the deceased was a “dependant” and thus eligible to receive the superannuation funds, despite the lack of a binding nomination and no formal spouse relationship. A deceased member’s NLN (Non-lapsing Nomination – a Superannuation death benefit nomination allowing a member to direct their fund to pay their remaining super balance and insurance benefits to specific individuals) can also direct that benefits be passed on to their estate following their death.
The SCT decided to set aside the NLN. It involved a sister living in another country. The applicant did not prove an interdependent relationship. The SCT has ceased operations, and the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) now handles complaints about superannuation products.
In Robinson v Glennon [2025] NSWSC 770, Brereton J found that partial dependency was adequate to grant a family provision claim. The couple had separated, with the plaintiff not knowing of the deceased’s death for several weeks. Yet, evidence of intermittent accommodation, domestic assistance and emotional reliance over a decade established a relationship of dependency.
This broad approach confirms that dependency arises in diverse and non-traditional relationships, including former partners, friends, informal carers, or housemates, where some element of financial or emotional interdependence exists. Ultimately, the recognition of the plaintiff’s moral and practical dependence led Brereton J to order provision of the deceased’s entire modest estate, despite the defendant’s legal entitlement under intestacy and significant legal costs of administration exceeding $150,000
In Robinson v Glennon [2025] NSWSC 770, Brereton J decided that the plaintiff’s claim for family provision would succeed. Brereton J made a judgment in the plaintiff’s favour. Although limited information was available about the defendant’s legal expenses, his honour proposed capping those costs at $100,000 – approximately two-thirds of a complete indemnity assessment – to be paid from the estate. Reasonable administrative expenses, like funeral costs and property maintenance, would also be covered. Additionally, Brereton J included the protection of the estate assets. The estate would also need to cover the mortgage and any outstanding rates or charges.
Due to these liabilities, the Tyndale property was anticipated to be sold to cover the costs and expenses. The Subaru vehicle would either be sold or transferred to the plaintiff.
Brereton J emphasised the importance of avoiding further unnecessary legal costs. Nonetheless, he accepted that some extra expenses were inevitable in implementing the judgment. His Honour invited the defendant to make brief submissions if she wished to contest the $100,000 cap and provide a detailed list of the expenses for which she sought indemnity. The plaintiff would then have the chance to respond.
The Court noted that proper administration would require co-operation between the plaintiff and the defendant, which had previously proved problematic. Although the plaintiff was not obliged to engage solicitors, Brereton J observed that doing so would likely make the process more efficient. It would also be beneficial in realising the judgment’s outcome.
Robinson v Glennon (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 1120 concerned costs and the final form of orders to implement the judgment.
Courts have broad discretion when determining costs in family provision cases, which differ from those in ordinary civil proceedings. Under s 99 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW), the Court may order that costs be paid from the estate as it considers just. The guiding principle is the “overall justice of the case” (Singer v Berghouse), although the usual rule that costs follow the event still applies—albeit more flexibly (Jvancich v Kennedy (No 2); Salmon v Osmond; Chapple v Wilcox).
Robinson v Glennon (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 1120, concerns an administrator who unsuccessfully defended a family provision claim. Generally, executors and administrators are entitled to have properly and reasonably incurred costs reimbursed from the estate, including litigation expenses, where they acted reasonably and in good faith—even if unsuccessful (Nobarani v Mariconte (No 2)[2018] HCA 49; 92 ALJR 1031) Examples include defending the Will’s validity or appealing to uphold probate.
However, recoverability depends on the nature of the litigation. In Pang v Fong (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 1924, Robb J noted that an executor defending a family provision claim acts not as a private litigant but as a representative of the estate and its beneficiaries, with a duty to uphold the Will and provide relevant evidence proportionately. The executor’s role can vary depending on whether they also benefit personally under the Will or act solely on behalf of others.
Competing Submissions on Costs
The defendant and administrator of the estate sought:
- full indemnity reimbursement for the administrative work of the estate, and
- an additional order for her legal costs of the litigation (capped at $110,000).
The plaintiff accepted the first point—that the estate should reimburse the defendant for legitimate administrative expenses—but opposed any further recovery of litigation costs.
The plaintiff did not seek her own costs.
Applicable Principles
Under s 99 of the Succession Act 2006 (NSW), the Court has broad discretion to determine costs in the manner most consistent with “the overall justice of the case”. While costs generally follow the event, family provision proceedings are treated with exceptional flexibility because administrators or executors are not ordinary litigants; they often defend claims on behalf of the estate.
Authorities such as Singer v Berghouse [1993] HCA 35, Salmon v Osmond [2015] NSWCA 42, and Haertsch v Whiteway (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 287 confirm this discretionary approach. However, where an executor or administrator primarily acts in their own interests, the justification for estate-funded costs is weakened (Nobarani v Mariconte (No 2) [2018] HCA 49).
Character of the defendant’s Role
Brereton J noted that the defendant was not an executor defending a Will, but an administrator of an intestate estate. The defendant effectively defended the proceedings to preserve her own entitlement to inherit the estate under the intestacy rules. Therefore, the defendant conducted the litigation for her own personal benefit, rather than on behalf of other beneficiaries or the estate. Since the defendant was unsuccessful, she should bear most of those costs. As emphasised in Forsyth v Sinclair (No 2) (2010) 28 VR 635 at [27], parties cannot assume that the estate will automatically fund estate litigation.
However, Brereton J found it appropriate to allow the defendant some contribution from the estate in light of several factors:
- assuming the responsibility for administering the estate when the deceased had made no such arrangements;
- reasonableness for the defendant to investigate whether the plaintiff’s substance, and
- some of the defendant’s legal costs resulted from the plaintiff’s actions (particularly before the involvement of her current solicitor).
Balancing these considerations, Brereton J awarded the defendant $50,000 (inclusive of GST) from the estate towards her costs, without a precise calculation. Still, it reflected that, after mediation failed, the defendant should have realised she was defending the case for her personal benefit. The figure of $50,000, supported by submissions made at trial, was deemed a fair and reasonable allowance.
Proportionality and Conduct
Evidence showed that the defendant’s total legal costs exceeded $136,000, despite the estate being worth approximately $315,000. Brereton J found the legal costs disproportionate but declined to criticise the defendant’s lawyers, acknowledging:
- the proceedings involved several hearings, subpoenas, and a three-day trial;
- the plaintiff’s self-representation at certain stages increased costs; and
- the defendant’s settlement offer (50% of the estate) before trial, indicating a genuine attempt to resolve the matter.
Given the size of the estate, Brereton J stressed the need for proportionality and cost vigilance in family provision matters.
Outcome on Costs
Balancing these considerations, Brereton J ordered that:
- the defendant may recover $50,000 (including GST) from the estate towards her legal costs,
- together with full indemnity reimbursement for undisputed administrative expenses (letters of administration fees, funeral costs, insurance, and filing fees), and
- bearing all other litigation costs personally.
The $50,000 figure was a discretionary, “instinctive” assessment reflecting fairness rather than a precise accounting exercise.
Former Solicitors’ Application
The plaintiff’s former solicitors, City Lawyers and Consultants, sought a separate order for $60,000 from the estate. Brereton J refused to entertain the application, finding that the Solicitors ‘ private contract between the firm and its former client was not properly part of these proceedings.
Administration and Property Orders
Brereton J made directions for the sale and distribution of the Tyndale property (the principal estate asset) by the defendant as administrator. Applying sale proceeds to:
- discharge the mortgage,
- reimburse the defendant for administration expenses,
- pay the defendant $50,000 litigation costs, and
- transfer the balance to the plaintiff.
The Subaru vehicle is to be transferred to the plaintiff (if not already sold).
Rejecting the defendant’s proposal to take title to the property and pay the debts later, as it would unfairly delay reimbursement to the administrator.
Brereton J invited the parties to agree within 7 days, or to file competing drafts (limited to three pages of submissions each).
Key Takeaways
Costs in family provision cases depend on fairness, proportionality, and the nature of the administrator’s role.
An administrator defending a claim for their own benefit will rarely recover full indemnity costs. The Court emphasised that litigation costs cannot consume modest estates, Geoghegan v Szelid [2011] NSWSC 144 and Shelley v Prager (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 1553
The decision reiterates that administrators should expect to bear personal responsibility for excessive or self-interested litigation expenses.