Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act excludes evidence obtained improperly, unlawfully, or as a result of impropriety or illegality. The court retains a discretion to admit such evidence if the desirability of admitting it outweighs the undesirability of the way it was obtained. Section 138(3) sets out the factors relevant to this assessment.
(a) the evidence’s probative value;
(b) its importance to the proceeding;
(c) the nature of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence, and the proceeding’s subject matter;
(d) the seriousness of the impropriety or contravention;
(e) whether the conduct was deliberate or reckless;
(f) whether the conduct infringed, or was inconsistent with, a right recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(g) whether other proceedings concerning the conduct have been commenced or are likely; and
(h) any difficulty in obtaining the evidence through proper and lawful means.
Section 138 requires the court to balance factors for and against admission. Evidence obtained improperly or unlawfully is excluded unless the circumstances, on balance, favour admission. The court may admit highly probative evidence if the public interest in its admission is compelling, but serious and deliberate breaches of the law will generally weigh against admission. The outcome depends on the facts of each case.
Practitioners should take practical steps when considering the admissibility of evidence under s 138. This includes thoroughly documenting any consent to recordings, collecting evidence lawfully where possible, and seeking alternative sources of evidence that do not raise legal issues. Lawyers should assess the probative value of each piece of evidence and consider whether permissible means can obtain similar information. Where potentially problematic evidence is relied upon, clear records of the steps taken and the reasons for necessity can help support an argument for admission. Early identification of such issues also allows time to address possible objections and minimise the risk of exclusion at trial.
Recent probate and civil cases show how s 138 is applied in practice. For example, in Rathswohl v Court [2020] NSWSC 1490, the court admitted a recording made by the other child in the family of a conversation with the father using her mobile phone, made without the father’s knowledge or consent, as “reasonably necessary for the protection of the lawful interests”at [35]
Recording a conversation for the purpose of extracting money, inducing further improper conduct or to blackmail the recorded party will indicate to the contrary.
Whether it was important to protect oneself from being accused of fabricating a conversation and recording the conversation was the only practical means of refuting such an allegation. This is more likely to be the case where the conversation concerns a serious criminal matter or the principal party has a genuine concern for their safety or that of their children.
Whether there were other practical means of recording the conversation, for example, reporting the matter to police or making a contemporaneous file note.
Whether there was a serious dispute on foot between the parties, including where determination of the dispute would vitally depend upon oral evidence and thus, one person’s word against another. Recordings of conversations ‘just in case’ there is a dispute, or for the sake of making an accurate record of what was said, is not enough.
Rees J set out that Ms Davies did have a “lawful interest”at [42] in the conversation with her father, as she was concerned whether her sister was providing the care she claimed to be administering.
On whether Davies should have told her father she was recording the conversation, Rees J found that, if he had been notified, it may have stifled his willingness to provide honest answers to questions about sensitive family matters.
Audio Recording
In probate proceedings, a contested Will may involve an audio recording made without consent that discloses the deceased’s testamentary intentions. If the recording is highly probative and no other evidence addresses the relevant issue, the court may give it significant weight in the balancing exercise. Where the recording was obtained through a serious and deliberate statutory breach and alternative evidence is available, exclusion is likely. Alternative admissible evidence the court may prefer can include contemporaneous medical reports documenting the deceased’s cognitive function, statements or certificates from treating doctors, witness statements from those who observed the deceased’s capacity or wishes, and written or video evidence properly obtained without breaching privacy laws and demonstrating the application of s 138 in civil proceedings, focusing on probative value, available alternatives, and the seriousness of the conduct.
Evidence Act 1998 (NSW)
In Kadir v The Queen; Grech v The Queen (2020) 267 CLR 109; [2020] HCA 1 at [12]–[13] and [15], the High Court considered covert footage obtained by trespassing and installing optical surveillance devices in contravention of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW). The High Court explained that s 138 gives effect to competing public interests. Admission serves the public interest in placing relevant evidence before the tribunal of fact. Exclusion reflects the public interest in ensuring that courts do not endorse or encourage improper or unlawful evidence-gathering. Section 138 of the Evidence Act does not provide that, if evidence obtained is “improperly or in contravention of an Australian law”, then other evidence obtained “in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an Australian law” will necessarily be excluded.
Unlike the discretion considered in Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54, where Stephen and Aickin JJ held that
to treat cogency of evidence as a factor favouring admission, where the illegality in obtaining it has been either deliberate or reckless, may serve to foster the quite erroneous view that if such evidence be but damning enough that will of itself suffice to atone for the illegality involved in procuring it
s 138 applies beyond criminal proceedings and is not restricted to misconduct by police or other law enforcement officers. The discretion is therefore one to admit evidence that would otherwise be excluded, where the competing public interests justify that result. The legislation does not prescribe the relative weight or direction of the factors in s 138(3). Their significance and interaction depend upon the circumstances, including whether the proceeding is civil or criminal and whether law enforcement officers were involved.
In R v Riley [2020] NSWCCA 283 at [109]–[111], Bathurst CJ, with whom Wilson J agreed, explained that the factors in s 138(3) must be considered but do not exhaust the matters relevant to the assessment. In criminal proceedings involving unlawful law enforcement conduct, the balance includes the public interest in securing convictions and the countervailing interest in avoiding judicial endorsement or encouragement of that conduct.
Unfairness to the accused is one consideration, not the sole concern. Although the assessment is evaluative and the factors may point in different directions, his Honour considered that the statutory question requires a single correct outcome. On that approach, an appellate court may substitute its conclusion where it considers the trial judge’s answer incorrect, notwithstanding the evaluative nature of the assessment, as the exercise involves applying a statutory test to the facts found, rather than exercising discretionary or subjective judgment.
As a result, appellate courts may review the matter afresh and substitute their own conclusion if they find the primary judge erred in applying the required legal standard.
Where reliance is placed on s 138(1)(b), a causal connection must be established between the impropriety or illegality and the acquisition of the evidence. This requires a “but for” chain of causation linking the conduct to the evidence obtained: R v Grech; R v Kadir [2017] NSWCCA 288 at [119] (Ward JA, Price and Beech-Jones JJ).
Ace v Boulas [2026] NSWSC 1436
Ace v Boulas [2026] NSWSC 1436 concerns the validity of a Will executed by Maria Boulas (the deceased) on 14 July 2023. At the time, the deceased was 103 years old and in the final months of her life. The deceased’s daughter, Koula Ace (the plaintiff), challenges the Will in proceedings against the deceased’s son, John Boulas (the defendant). The plaintiff alleges that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity. Alternatively, the plaintiff alleges that the deceased did not know and approve the contents of the Will, or that the defendant procured the Will by undue influence.
Exclusion of Recorded Conversation
On the first day of trial, the defendant sought reconsideration of provisional rulings made prior to the hearing on the plaintiff’s objections to evidence. The court had provisionally excluded video and audio recordings of conversations between the deceased and the plaintiff, captured by a CCTV system installed at the deceased’s home at the defendant’s direction. A written transcript of an extract from one of their telephone conversations, translated from Greek into English (the Transcript), was also provisionally excluded. The recordings and the Transcript were exhibits to the defendant’s affidavits. The defendant tendered only the audio recording of the telephone conversation transcribed in the Transcript (the defendant’s affidavit affirmed 2 December 2024 at [19], Court Book at 427–433).
The plaintiff objected to admitting the Transcript under s 138(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), submitting that the conversation was recorded without the knowledge or consent of either participant. On the first day of the hearing, the defendant submitted that the Transcript was relevant and that both the deceased and the plaintiff were aware of the CCTV system and its audio recording capability, and had implicitly consented to being recorded (T3–5). The court indicated that it would revisit the provisional ruling after the plaintiff had read her affidavits, been cross-examined, and closed her case, and the defendant had read the affidavits on which he relied (T5).
During cross-examination on the first day, the plaintiff acknowledged that they were aware of the CCTV system (T83–86). The plaintiff was not questioned regarding the Transcript.
On the third day, the single expert, Dr Mark Hohenberg, gave evidence concerning the plaintiff’s cognitive condition during the relevant period. Counsel for both parties cross-examined Dr Hohenberg. The Transcript was not raised in that context.
The defendant’s affidavits were read on the third day. The rulings on objections to those affidavits, including the exclusion of the Transcript, then became final (T188–189). The defendant first challenged these final rulings by application on the fifth day of the hearing.
At the commencement of the fifth day, the defendant sought admission of the Transcript, submitting that reference had been made to the underlying conversation during cross-examination. The defendant stated that he became aware the deceased was telling the plaintiff they were going to die after listening to an exchange recorded by the CCTV system on 29 July 2023 (T271–272).
Admission of a Transcript
The issue was whether the Transcript should be admitted under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).
The application concerns the Transcript, which is an English translation of part of a telephone conversation between the deceased and the plaintiff conducted in Greek. The CCTV system installed at the deceased’s home could pick up sound, but recording and saving audio required a separate step. In his affidavit affirmed 12 March 2025, the defendant stated that he saw the deceased become upset during the call and began recording the audio remotely using the Recorder App on his iPhone. That paragraph was not admitted into evidence. McGrath J referred to it only to explain the defendant’s account of how the recording was made. Based on evidence of the deceased’s significant deafness, His Honour inferred that the deceased had increased the phone volume sufficiently for the defendant to hear and record both sides of the conversation through the CCTV system.
Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW)
It is common ground that the deceased and the plaintiff were engaged in a private conversation within the meaning of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) (SDA) and that the defendant was not a party to it. The CCTV system and the Recorder App were each capable of capturing or monitoring spoken words and therefore came within the statutory definition of a listening device. The applicable provision is s 7(1)(a), which prohibits installing, using, causing the use of, or maintaining a listening device to overhear, record, monitor or listen to a private conversation to which the person is not a party.
The exception in s 7(3) operates in relation to s 7(1)(b), which concerns recording a private conversation by a party to it. Because the defendant was not a party to the call, submissions about the deceased, the plaintiff’s consent, and the protection of the deceased’s lawful interests do not engage that exception (T314). Had those matters fallen for determination, McGrath J would have found that:
(a) there was no evidence that either the deceased or the plaintiff knew the call was being recorded, and the defendant had not established express or implied consent from either of them, and
(b) the defendant made the recording in his own interests. Neither making the recording nor preparing the Transcript was reasonably necessary to protect the interests of the deceased or her estate.
His Honour also rejected the defendant’s submission that, because he arranged the installation on the deceased’s behalf, they should be treated as having installed the system and contravened the SDA (T315). No evidence shows that the deceased installed, used, caused the use of, or maintained the CCTV system. The defendant’s affidavit, affirmed on 2 December 2024 at [32], states that they arranged its installation and used it themself.
Section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)
The Court has the discretion to exclude evidence pursuant to section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) To prove causation, the court needs to be persuaded that were it not “but for” the unlawful arrest, the evidence would not have been obtained: R v Grech; R v Kadir [2017] NSWCCA 288 at [119]. Applying the Grech “but for” test, McGrath J was satisfied that the Transcript would not have been obtained but for the defendant’s contravention of s 7(1)(a) of the SDA. It was therefore obtained as a consequence of a contravention of Australian law.
Under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), McGrath J must determine whether the desirability of admitting the Transcript outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence obtained in that way.
The defendant submits that the Transcript is highly probative and important evidence of the deceased’s testamentary intentions, and that the Court is exercising its supervisory jurisdiction in probate. The defendant also submits that they came across the conversation inadvertently while reviewing the CCTV footage and did not set out to record it (T314).
The decision
McGrath J rejected the defendant’s submission that the call was not specifically recorded. The defendant’s affidavit described the steps taken to record the conversation. His Honour addressed the submissions concerning sections 7(1) and 7(3) of the SDA.
The Transcript is relevant but records only part of the call. It is unlikely to resolve whether the deceased had testamentary capacity at the relevant time. The broader context of the conversation is unknown. No corresponding video footage is available. The Transcript had limited probative value. Partial recordings risk omitting key parts of the discussion that may clarify the deceased’s mental state or intentions. Without the full context, the meaning, tone, and circumstances of the recorded exchange cannot be determined. This diminishes the weight the Transcript can carry. In assessing probative value, courts consider both what the evidence shows and what it may omit or distort. There is also uncertainty about whether the call was recorded on 29 or 31 July 2023. This uncertainty does not materially affect the admissibility question (T316).
Alternative Evidence
Alternative admissible evidence could have included:
– contemporaneous medical reports regarding the deceased’s cognitive function
– statements from treating doctors
– independent witness observations of the deceased’s conduct and understanding
– properly obtained written or video evidence of the deceased discussing her wishes.
Such lawful evidence may be relied on to establish testamentary capacity and generally carries more weight. Their collection does not raise the same legal or contextual issues.
The defendant began recording after observing, via the CCTV system, that the deceased appeared upset. No evidence was submitted that the recording was made deliberately and covertly. The contravention was serious and carried a maximum penalty of an $11,000 fine, five years’ imprisonment, or both. McGrath J found that the recording from which the Transcript was prepared was unlawful. As in Thomas v Nash (2010) 107 SASR 309; [2010] SASC 153, his Honour discerned no public interest supporting its admission.
McGrath J also noted that the defendant’s conduct was inconsistent with art 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects against unlawful interference with a person’s privacy, family, home or correspondence and recognises the right to legal protection against such interference. By recording the private call, the defendant substantially intruded upon the privacy of both the deceased and the plaintiff.
McGrath J considered it very unlikely that another proceeding would be commenced concerning the defendant’s breach of s 7 of the SDA. Given the animosity between the parties, however, the plaintiff may still consider bringing a civil claim arising from the recording. The defendant could have prepared the probate case with little difficulty using lawfully obtained evidence. McGrath J recognised that the deceased’s death makes it impossible to obtain further evidence from her.
The matters listed in section 138(3) are not exhaustive. McGrath J considered the potential prejudice to the plaintiff if the Transcript were admitted after the parties had presented their evidence and completed cross-examination. Admitting evidence at a late stage can cause procedural unfairness. The affected party may lose the opportunity to respond properly. For example, the plaintiff would be prevented from questioning other witnesses about the Transcript or challenging its contents through earlier cross-examination. This could disadvantage her case.
Just, Quick and Cheap resolution
Further cross-examination could reduce procedural unfairness to the defendant. In considering this course, His Honour must have regard to the overriding purpose in section 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in dispute. Proportionality of costs in probate proceedings under Supreme Court Practice Note SC EQ 07 must also be considered.
Admission would require, at a minimum, recalling Dr Hohenberg and the defendant to afford the plaintiff procedural fairness. The plaintiff conducted her case with the Transcript excluded and did not cross-examine Dr Hohenberg about it. The defendant accepted that Dr Hohenberg might have been taken to the Transcript (T308–309). The plaintiff may also need to question the defendant about it. Recalling witnesses would require a further hearing day and increase legal and expert costs. The application has already occupied the day set aside for closing submissions, which have been postponed until March 2027. Having weighed these matters, McGrath J excluded the transcript under s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995(NSW), not satisfied that the desirability of admitting it outweighs the undesirability of admitting it given the way it was obtained. I therefore
ORDERS
- The Transcript is not admitted into evidence.
