Luigi Borazio (the “testator”), died in February 2007, leaving his widow (and third wife) Rosa a life interest and the chattels in their family home in Blacktown plus $10,000. Rosa was to pay all outgoings. The balance of the estate was given to the testator’s four daughters by his first wife equally. Rosa commenced a claim under the Family Provision Act 1982 submitting that Luigi did not make adequate provision for her in his last will. The Court dismissed her claim.
Janet Pentelow, a barrister, was engaged to appear by Bell Lawyers in the matter; a dispute arose between Pentelow and Bell as to the payment of Ms Pentelow’s fees, leading to recovery proceedings. Although initially unsuccessful, on appeal the New South Wales Supreme Court ordered that Bell Lawyers pay Ms Pentelow’s professional costs for the Local and Supreme Court proceedings.
Pentelow subsequently forwarded a memorandum of costs to Bell pursuant to the Supreme Court’s costs orders, which included sums for costs incurred on her own behalf and the provision of legal services Pentelow provided in the Local Court and Supreme Court proceedings. Although Pentelow was represented by a solicitor in the Local Court proceeding, and by solicitors and senior counsel in the Supreme Court proceeding, she had undertaken preparatory legal work and had attended court on a number of occasions.
Generally, a litigant may recover as costs their solicitor’s fees but not for the value of their time spent in litigation. Under an exception to the general rule, commonly referred to as “the Chorley exception” a solicitor may recover costs for their own time, as a litigant in person who has some professional skill in respect of the time spent exercising that skill.
In London Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 the English Court of Appeal held that a litigant in person who was a solicitor was entitled on taxation to the same costs as if he had employed a solicitor, even though he had undertaken the tasks himself, therefore, employing another solicitor was unnecessary. Chorley is based on purely pragmatic grounds that where there has been a measurable expenditure of professional skill and labour by the solicitor, that would otherwise have been completed by another employed solicitor that, if successful, could be recovered.
Bell refused to pay the costs claimed for the work personally undertaken by Pentelow. A costs assessor rejected Pentelow’s claim for the costs of the work she had performed and that decision was affirmed on appeal before the Review Panel and the District Court of New South Wales.
Pentelow sought judicial review of the decision of the District Court in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal, by majority, held that Pentelow was entitled to rely upon the Chorley Exception notwithstanding that she was a barrister and not a solicitor.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the Chorley Exception extends to barristers as well as solicitors as admission to practice law is uniform for both barristers and solicitors under the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). The self-represented work performed by solicitors and barristers is similar; the Chorley Exception applies where an otherwise eligible costs applicant performed legal work themselves, such as drafting pleadings and affidavits, as prescribed in the New South Wales Bar Association Barristers’ Conduct Rules.
Bell Lawyers appealed to the High Court; which unanimously held that the Chorley exception should not be extended to the benefit of barristers. Further, a majority of the Court held that the Chorley exception should not be recognised as part of the common law of Australia because it is an anomaly that represents an affront to the fundamental value of equality of all persons before the law and cannot be justified by the considerations of policy said to support it. In addition, the anomalous nature of the Chorley exception is inconsistent with the statutory definition of “costs” in s 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).